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Abstract
We study adversarial robustness of neural networks from a margin maximization perspective,
where margins are defined as the distances from inputs to a classifier’s decision boundary. In
theory, we show that maximizing margins can be achieved by minimizing the adversarial loss on
the decision boundary at the “shortest successful perturbation”. This max-margin perspective
also provides an alternative interpretation on adversarial training with a fixed perturbation
magnitude : adversarial training is maximizing either a lower bound or an upper bound of the
margin. Motivated by our theoretical analysis, we propose Max-Margin Adversarial (MMA)
training to directly maximize the margins. Instead of adversarial training with a fixed , MMA
offers an improvement by selecting the margin as the “correct”  individually for each point. We
demonstrate MMA training’s efficacy and analyze its properties on the MNIST and CIFAR10
datasets w.r.t. `∞ and `2 robustness.
1 Introduction
Figure 1: Illustration of decision bound-
ary, adversarial perturbation, shortest
successful perturbation, margin and etc.
Despite their impressive performances on various learning
tasks, neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable
to adversarial perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2013; Big-
gio et al., 2013). An artificially constructed imperceptible
perturbation can cause a significant drop in the prediction
accuracy of an otherwise accurate network. The level of
distortion is measured by the magnitude of the perturba-
tions (e.g. in `∞ or `2 norms), i.e. the distance from the
original input to the perturbed input.
As shown in Figure 1, the classifier changes its prediction
from panda to bucket when the input is perturbed. The
margin from a data point to the decision boundary of the classifier can be defined as the minimal
length of a successful perturbation. In particular, let L01θ (x, y) = I(yˆ 6= y) be the 0-1 loss indicating
classification error, where I(·) is the indicator function. For an input (x, y), we define its margin
w.r.t. the classifier fθ(·) as:
dθ(x, y) = ‖δ∗‖ = min ‖δ‖ s.t. δ : L01θ (x+ δ, y) = 1, (1)
where δ∗ = arg minL01θ (x+δ,y)=1 ‖δ‖ is the “shortest successful perturbation”. Intuitively, the margin
of (x, y) is the minimum distance that we have to perturb x, to make the prediction go wrong. Thus
the farther the distance from the input to the decision boundary of the classifier, the more robust
the classifier is w.r.t. this input.
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While it is intuitive that one can achieve the greatest possible robustness by maximizing the margin
of a classifier, such maximization comes with technical difficulties. To see this issue, note that the
constraint in the margin definition in Eq. (1) depends on network parameters, thus margin maxi-
mization is a max-min nested optimization problem with a parameter-dependent constraint in its
inner minimization.1 In this paper, we show that margin maximization can still be achieved by
minimizing a classification loss w.r.t. model parameters, at the “shortest successful perturbation”.
For smooth functions, a stronger result exists: the gradient of the margin w.r.t. model parameters
can be analytically calculated, as a scaled gradient of the loss. Such results make gradient descent
viable for margin maximization, despite the fact that model parameters are entangled in the con-
straints. We further analyze adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017; Huang et al., 2015) from the
perspective of margin maximization. We show that, for each training example, adversarial training
with fixed perturbation length  is maximizing a lower (or upper) bound of the margin, if  is smaller
(or larger) than the margin of that training point.
Based on our analyses, we propose Max-Margin Adversarial (MMA) training, a practical algorithm
for direct input margin maximization. MMA training improves adversarial training, in the sense that
it selects the “correct” , the margin value for each example. We test and compare MMA training
with other adversarial training variants on MNIST and CIFAR10 w.r.t. `∞ and `2 robustness. Our
method achieves high average robust accuracies under different perturbation magnitudes, which
echoes its goal of maximizing the average margin. MMA training automatically balances accuracy
vs robustness while being insensitive to its key hyperparameter, hinge threshold. This contrasts
sharply with the sensitivity of PGD training to its fixed perturbation magnitude. MMA trained
models not only often matches performances of the best PGD trained model with carefully chosen
training  under different scenarios, it also matches the performance of ensembles of PGD trained
models.
1.1 Related Works
Many defense methods can be interpreted as increasing the margins. One class uses regularization
to constrain the model’s Lipschitz constant (Cisse et al., 2017; Ross and Doshi-Velez, 2017; Hein
and Andriushchenko, 2017; Tsuzuku et al., 2018), thus a sample with small loss would have a large
margin since the loss cannot increase too fast. If the Lipschitz constant is merely regularized at the
data points, it is usually too local and not accurate in a neighborhood. When globally enforced, the
Lipschitz constraint on the model is often too strong that it harms accuracy. So far, such methods
have not achieved strong robustness. There are also efforts using first-order approximation to
estimate and maximize input space margin (Elsayed et al., 2018; Sokolic et al., 2017; Matyasko and
Chau, 2017). Similar to local Lipschitz regularization, the reliance on local information might not
provide accurate margin estimation and efficient maximization. Motivated by margin maximization,
Croce et al. (2018) aim to enlarge the linear region around a input example, such that the closest
point on the decision boundary to the input example is included. Here, the margin can be calculated
analytically and hence maximized. However, the analysis only works on ReLU networks, and the
implementation so far only works on improving robustness under small perturbations. We defer
some detailed discussions on related works to Appendix C, including a comparison between MMA
training and SVM.
1.2 Notations and Definitions
We focus on K-class classification problems. Denote (x, y) as an input-label data pair from data dis-
tribution D. We consider the classifier as a score function fθ(x) =
(
f1θ (x), . . . , f
K
θ (x)
)
, parametrized
1In adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017), the constraint on the inner max does NOT have such problem.
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Figure 2: A 1-D example on how margin is affected by decreasing the loss at different locations.
by θ, which assigns score f iθ(x) to the i-th class. The predicted label of x is then decided by
yˆ = arg maxi f
i
θ(x). The 0-1 loss in Eq. (1) is hard to work with, due to its discontinuity.
Therefore we give an equivalent definition of margin with the “logit margin loss” LLMθ (x, y) =
maxj 6=y f
j
θ (x) − fyθ (x)2. Note that the level set {x : LLMθ (x, y) = 0} corresponds to the de-
cision boundary of class y. Also, when LLMθ (x, y) < 0, the classification is correct, and when
LLMθ (x, y) ≥ 0, the classification is wrong. Therefore, we can define the margin in Eq. (1) in an
equivalent way by LLMθ (·) as:
dθ(x, y) = ‖δ∗‖ = min ‖δ‖ s.t. δ : LLMθ (x+ δ, y) ≥ 0, (2)
where δ∗ = arg minLLMθ (x+δ,y)≥0 ‖δ‖ is again the “shortest successful perturbation”. For the rest of
the paper, we use the term “margin” to denote dθ(x, y) in Eq. (2). For other notions of margin, we
will use specific phrases, e.g. “SLM-margin” or “logit margin.”
2 Margin Maximization
We aim to improve adversarial robustness by maximizing the average margin of the data distribution
D by solving the following optimization problem:
max
θ
Ex,y∼Ddθ(x, y), where dθ(x, y) = min
δ:LLMθ (x+δ,y)≥0
‖δ‖. (3)
We show that this can be achieved by minimizing the loss at the shortest successful perturbation.
In particular, we show 1) how to calculate the gradient of the margin under some smoothness
assumption, and 2) without smoothness, margin maximization can still be achieved by minimizing
the loss at the shortest successful perturbation. Figure 2 presents an imaginary example to illustrate
how the margin can be increased by decreasing the loss. Consider a 1-D example in Figure 2 (a),
where the input example x is a scalar. We perturb x in the positive direction with perturbation
δ. As we fix (x, y), we overload L(δ, θ) = LLMθ (x + δ, y), which is monotonically increasing on δ,
namely larger perturbation results in higher loss. Let L(·, θ0) (the dashed curve) denote the original
2Since the scores
(
f1θ (x), . . . , f
K
θ (x)
)
output by fθ are also called logits in neural network literature.
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function before an update step, and δ∗0 = arg minL(δ,θ0)≥0 ‖δ‖ denote the corresponding margin
(same as shortest successful perturbation in 1D). As shown in Figure 2 (b), as the parameter is
updated to θ1 such that L(δ∗0 , θ1) is reduced, the new margin δ∗1 = arg minL(δ,θ1)≥0 ‖δ‖ is enlarged.
Intuitively, a reduced value of the loss at the shortest successful perturbation leads to an increase
in margin.
2.1 Calculating Gradients of Margins for Smooth Loss and Norm
We now show how to analytically compute the the gradient of the margin w.r.t. to the model
parameter, ∇θdθ(x, y), at a single example (x, y) for piecewise twice continuously differentiable (C2
smooth) loss functions. Note that computing such gradients for a linear model is easy due to the
existence of its closed-form solution, e.g. SVM, but it is not so for general functions such as neural
networks.
Recall that dθ(x, y) = ‖δ∗‖ = minL(δ,θ)≥0 ‖δ‖, where we overload the loss notation with L(θ, δ) =
LLMθ (x+ δ, y) for simplicity, as we are considering only one fixed example. It is easy to see that for
a wrongly classified example (x, y), δ∗ is achieved at 0 and thus ∇θdθ(x, y) = 0. Therefore we focus
on correctly classified examples. Denote the Lagrangian as Lθ(δ, λ) = ‖δ‖ + λL(δ, θ). For a fixed
θ, denote the optimizers of Lθ(δ, λ) by δ∗ and λ∗ . The following theorem shows how to compute
∇θdθ(x, y).
Theorem 2.1. Let (δ) = ‖δ‖. Given a fixed θ, assume that δ∗ is unique, (δ) and L(δ, θ) are
C2 functions in a neighborhood of (θ, δ∗), and the matrix
(
∂2(δ∗)
∂δ2
+ λ∗ ∂
2L(δ∗,θ)
∂δ2
∂L(δ∗,θ)
∂δ
∂L(δ∗,θ)
∂δ
>
0
)
is full
rank, then
∇θdθ(x, y) = C(θ, x, y)∂L(δ
∗, θ)
∂θ
, where C(θ, x, y) =
〈
∂(δ∗)
∂δ ,
∂L(δ∗,θ)
∂δ
〉
‖∂L(δ∗,θ)∂δ ‖22
is a scalar.
The significance of Theorem 2.1 is that the margin’s gradient w.r.t. to the model parameter θ is
proportional to the loss’ gradient w.r.t. θ at δ∗, the shortest successful perturbation. Therefore to
perform gradient ascent on margin, we just need to find δ∗ and perform gradient descent on the
loss.
2.2 Margin Maximization for Non-smooth Loss and Norm
Theorem 2.1 requires the loss function and the norm to be C2 at δ∗. This might not be the case for
many functions used in practice, e.g. ReLU networks and the `∞ norm. Our next result shows that
under a weaker condition of directional differentiability (instead of C2), learning θ to maximize the
margin can still be done by decreasing L(θ, δ∗) w.r.t. θ, at δ = δ∗0 , the short successful perturbation
in the input space w.r.t. the current parameter θ = θ0. Due to space limitations, we only present
an informal statement here. Rigorous statements can be found in the Appendix A.
Proposition 2.1. Let δ∗ be unique and L(δ, θ) be the loss of a deep ReLU network. There exists
some direction ~v in the parameter space, such that the loss L(δ, θ)|δ=δ∗ can be reduced in the direction
of ~v. Furthermore, by reducing L(δ, θ)|δ=δ∗ , the margin is also guaranteed to be increased.
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3 Understanding Adversarial Training through Margin Maximiza-
tion
We have shown that margin maximization is closely related to adversarial training with the optimal
perturbation length δ∗ in the previous section. In this section we analyze the standard adversarial
training with fixed perturbation magnitude (Huang et al., 2015; Madry et al., 2017), from the
perspective of margin maximization. Adversarial training tends to minimize the “worst-case” loss
under a fixed perturbation magnitude , as follows.
min
θ
Ex,y∼D max‖δ‖≤
Lθ(x+ δ, y). (4)
Our first observation is that an adversarial training update step does not necessarily increase the
margin, as also illustrated in Figure 2. In particular, as we perform an update to reduce the value
of loss at the fixed perturbation , the parameter is updated from θ0 to θ1. After this update, we
imagine two different scenarios of the updated loss functions Lθ1(·) (the solid curve) in Figure 2
(c) and (d). In both (c) and (d), Lθ1() is decreased by the same amount. However, the margin is
increased in (c) with δ∗1 > δ∗0 , but decreased in (d) with δ∗1 < δ∗0 .
3.1 Adversarial Training with the Logit Margin Loss
We consider the case where adversarial training is performed using the logit margin loss, where given
a sample (x, y) and a fixed length . Recall that adversarial training learns a model f by minimizing
the adversarial loss, max‖δ‖≤ Lθ(x+δ, y), in Eq. (4). For simplicity, we denote Lθ(x+δ, y) by L(δ, θ)
in this section. Fix ρ ∈ R, let ∗(ρ) = minδ:L(δ,θ)≥ρ ‖δ‖ be the minimal magnitude to reach the level
set of L(δ, θ) ≥ ρ. Note that when ρ = 0, ∗(ρ) is the margin as defined in Eq. (2).
For a given (x, y) and a fixed perturbation magnitude , let ρ∗ = max‖δ‖≤ L(δ, θ). By arguments
similar to Section 2.2, adversarial training is equivalent to enlarging ∗(ρ∗) for the normalized loss
L˜(δ, θ) = L(δ, θ) − ρ∗. Note that ∗(ρ∗) < ∗(0) if ρ∗ < 0, and ∗(ρ∗) > ∗(0) if ρ∗ > 0. Therefore,
adversarial training can alternatively be interpreted from a margin perspective, as:
Adversarial training, with the logit margin loss and a fixed perturbation length , is
1) exactly maximizing the margin, if  is equal to the margin;
2) maximizing a lower bound of the margin, if  is smaller than the margin;
3) maximizing an upper bound of the margin, if  is larger than the margin.
3.2 Adversarial Training with the Cross-Entropy Loss
We now extend the margin analysis to standard adversarial training methods that employs the
cross-entropy loss (Madry et al., 2017), LCEθ (x, y) = log
∑
j exp(f
j
θ (x))− fyθ (x)3. We define a “soft
logit margin loss” (SLM) as LSLMθ (x, y) = log
∑
j 6=y exp(f
j
θ (x))− fyθ (x), which serves as a surrogate
loss to the “logit margin loss” LLMθ (x, y) by replacing the the max function by the softmax function.
The SLM-margin can be defined accordingly as:
dSLMθ (x, y) = ‖δ∗‖ = min ‖δ‖ s.t. δ : LSLMθ (x+ δ, y) ≥ 0. (5)
3Note this is the cross-entropy function on the logits. See https://pytorch.org/docs/stable/nn.html#torch.
nn.CrossEntropyLoss for details.
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One immediate property is that the SLM loss is smooth and convex (w.r.t. logits), so it enjoys nicer
gradient properties than LM because max introduces non-smoothness. Furthermore, SLM loss is a
good approximation to the LM loss in the sense that
LSLMθ (x, y)− log(K − 1) ≤ LLMθ (x, y) ≤ LSLMθ (x, y), (6)
whereK denote the number of classes. Note that since LSLMθ (x, y) upper bounds L
LM
θ (x, y), we also
have {δ : LLMθ (x+ δ, y) ≤ 0} ⊆ {δ : LSLMθ (x+ δ, y) ≤ 0}. Therefore, we have dSLMθ (x, y) ≤ dθ(x, y),
i.e. the SLM-margin is a lower bound of the margin.
Our next result shows that the gradient of the SLM loss is proportional to the gradient of the cross
entropy loss, thus minimizing LCEθ (x+ δ
∗, y) w.r.t. θ “is” minimizing LSLMθ (x+ δ
∗, y).
Proposition 3.1. For a fixed (x, y) and θ,
∇θLCEθ (x, y) = r(θ, x, y)∇θLSLMθ (x, y), where the scalar r(θ, x, y) =
∑
i 6=y exp(f
i
θ(x))∑
i exp(f
i
θ(x))
. (7)
Therefore, summarizing all the properties above, we have:
Adversarial training, with the cross-entropy loss and a fixed perturbation length , maximizes
a lower bound of the margin, if  is smaller than or equal to the SLM-margin.
4 Max-Margin Adversarial Training
This section presents the MMA training algorithm, which directly uses margins in its objective:
min
θ
{
∑
i∈S+θ
max{0, dmax − dθ(xi, yi)}+
∑
j∈S−θ
Jθ(xj , yj)}, (8)
where Jθ(·) is a regular classification loss function, e.g. cross-entropy loss. The margin dθ(xi, yi)
is inside the hinge loss with threshold dmax (a hyperparameter), which means that the margin
is maximized when dθ(xi, yi) < dmax. S+θ = {i : LLMθ (xi, yi) < 0} is the set of all correctly
classified examples, and S−θ = {i : LLMθ (xi, yi) ≥ 0} is the set of wrongly classified examples.
Intuitively, MMA training minimizes classification loss on wrongly classified points in S−θ , until
they are correctly classified. For correctly classified points, MMA training maximizes the margin
dθ(xi, yi) until it reaches dmax. Note that we do not maximize margins on wrongly classified examples
as discussed in Section 2.1.
To minimize Eq. (8), first note that ∇θJθ(xj , yj) can be easily computed by standard back-
propagation. For the term of dθ(xi, yi), as discussed in Theorem 2.1 and Section 2.2, one can
instead update θ with the gradient of the logit margin loss at the shortest successful perturbation
δ∗.
In practice, we find gradients of the “logit margin loss” LLMθ is unstable. The piecewise nature of
LM can lead to discontinuity of its gradient, causing large fluctuations on the boundary between
the pieces. It also does not fully utilize information provide by all the logits. We instead try to
maximize a lower bound of the margin, the SLM-margin, dSLMθ (x, y) in Eq. (5). It is a lower bound
because the “soft logit margin loss” (SLM) both lower and upper bounds LLMθ , Eq. (6). Recall that
SLM loss also has the same gradient direction as the cross-entropy loss, Eq. (7). Therefore, once we
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use SLM loss to find δ∗, we can perform gradient descent on model parameters using LCEθ (x+δ
∗, y).
As such, we use LCEθ on both clean and adversarial examples, which in practice stabilizes training:
min
θ
{
∑
i∈S+θ ∩Hθ
LCEθ (xi + δ
∗, yi) +
∑
j∈S−θ
LCEθ (xj , yj)}, (9)
where δ∗ = arg minLSLMθ (x+δ,y)≥0 ‖δ‖ is found with the SLM loss, and Hθ = {i : dθ(xi, yi) < dmax}
is the set of examples that have margins smaller than the hinge threshold.
To implement MMA, we still need to find the δ∗, which is intractable in general settings. We
propose an adaptation of the projected gradient descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2017) attack to give
an approximate solution of δ∗, the Adaptive Norm Projective Gradient Descent Attack (AN-PGD).
In AN-PGD, we apply PGD on a initial perturbation magnitude init to find a norm-constrained
perturbation δ1, then we search along the direction of δ1 to find a scaled perturbation that gives
L = 0, we then use this scaled perturbation to approximate ∗. Note that AN-PGD here only serves
as an algorithm to give an approximate solution of δ∗, and it can be decoupled from the remaining
parts of MMA training. Other attacks that can serve a similar purpose can also fit into our MMA
training framework, e.g. the Decoupled Direction and Norm (DDN) attack (Rony et al., 2018). We
defer the details of MMA training algorithms to Algorithm 1 and 2 in Appendix D.
5 Experiments
We compare MMA training with different adversarial training algorithms on the MNIST and CI-
FAR10 datasets under `∞/`2-norm constrained perturbations. Our results show that MMA training
is stable to its hyperparameter dmax, and balances better among various attack lengths compared
to adversarial training. This suggests that MMA training is a better choice for defense when prior
information, e.g. the attack length, is unknown, which is often the case in practice. Due to space
limitations, we mainly present results on CIFAR10-`∞. Full results are in Table 2 to 13 in Ap-
pendix G. Implementation details are left to the appendix, including neural network model we used,
training and attacking hyperparameters.
5.1 Experiment Settings
Baselines: PGD training and its variants with gradually increasing global perturbation
magnitude. In all dataset and norm settings, we use PGD training (Madry et al., 2017) as a
baseline. We also propose a new PGD training method, called PGD with Linear Scaling (PGDLS),
as a new baseline. The intuition is that PGD training can be seen as maximizing the lower bound of
the margin if the perturbation magnitude is smaller than the margin, as discussed in Section 3. A
gradually increasing perturbation magnitude could avoid picking a  that is larger than the margin,
thus manages to maximizing the lower bound of the margin rather than its upper bound, which is
more sensible.
For PGDLS training experiments, the norm constraint grows from 0 to the fixed magnitude linearly
in 50 epochs. As later shown in Table 1, PGDLS achieves better performance than PGD. Note
that PGDLS training can also be seen as a “global magnitude scheduling” shared by all data points,
which is to be contrasted to MMA training that gives magnitude scheduling for each individual
example.
Trained models: Various PGD/PGDLS models are trained with different perturbation magnitude
, denoted by PGD- or PGDLS-. PGD-ens/PGDLS-ens represents the ensemble of PGD/PGDLS
7
(a) MMA-32-sd0 (b) PGD-8 (c) MMAC-32-sd0
Figure 3: Visualization of loss landscape in the input space for MMA and PGD trained models.
trained models with different ’s. The ensemble makes prediction by majority voting on label
predictions, and uses softmax scores as the tie breaker. We perform MMA training with different
hinge thresholds dmax, also with/without the additional clean loss (see next section for details).
When training with additional loss, we name it MMAC. For each dmax value, we train two models
with different random seeds, which serves two purposes: 1) confirming the performance of MMA
trained models are not significantly affected by random initialization; 2) to provide transfer attacks
from an “identical” model. As such, MMA trained models are named as MMA/MMAC-dmax-seed.
Evaluating robustness: We use projected gradient descent (PGD) (Madry et al. (2017)) to eval-
uate robustness. We use the robust accuracy under multiple PGD attacks as the robust measure.
Specifically, given an example, each model is attacked by both repeated randomly initialized white-
box PGD attacks and numerous transfer attacks, generated from whitebox PGD attacking other
models. If any one of these attack succeeds, then the model is considered “not robust under attack”
on this example. For each dataset-norm setting and for each example, under a particular magnitude
, we first perform N randomly initialized whitebox PGD attacks on each individual model, then
use N · (m − 1) PGD attacks from all the other models to perform transfer attacks, where m is
the total number of model considered under each setting. In our experiments, we use N = 50 for
models trained on MNIST and N = 10 for models trained on CIFAR10. The total number of the
“combined” (whitebox and transfer) set of attacks is 900 for MNIST-`∞, 320 for CIFAR10-`∞, 1200
for MNIST-`2 and 260 for CIFAR10-`2. As we show later, adding these transfer attacks significantly
improves the attack strength on some models. We also performed the SPSA attack (Uesato et al.,
2018), to all our `∞-MMA trained models, on the first 100 test examples. We find that, in all
cases, SPSA attack does not find any new adversarial examples on top of whitebox PGD attacks.
Therefore, robustness of MMA trained models are likely not due to gradient masking.
For brevity, we use ClnAcc for clean accuracy, AvgAcc for the average over both clean accuracy
and robust accuracies at different ’s, AvgRobAcc for the average over only robust accuracies under
attack, and TransferGaps for the robust accuracy gap between “under combined (whitebox+transfer)
attacks” and “only whitebox PGD attacks”.
5.2 Making Whitebox PGD Attack Stronger on MMA Trained Models
We observe that models trained with the MMA training objective in Eq. (9) have large TransferGaps,
e.g. MMA-32-sd0 achieves 53.70% under whitebox PGD attacks, but only achieves 46.31% robust
accuracy under combined (whitebox+transfer) attacks. This 7.39% TransferGap indicates that
whitebox PGD attack is not strong enough, namely, it does not maximize the loss well enough
within its -ball. This phenomenon is concerning since: 1) it makes the robustness evaluation
harder, as we will need transfer attacks from other models; 2) at training time, weak adversary
leads to poor approximation of δ∗, which hampers training.
One possible reason is that MMA training produces a much “flatter” loss curves in the neighbourhood
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Figure 4: Margin distributions during training, under the CIFAR10-`2 case. Each blue histogram
represents the margin value distribution of MMAC-3.0-sd0, and the orange represents PGD-2.5.
of the original data, which prevents PGD to find its optimal attack. We compare input space loss
landscapes of MMA-32-sd0 and PGD-8 in Figure 3. We choose 50 examples from both training and
test sets respectively, then perform PGD attack with  = 8/255 and keep those failed perturbations.
For each, we linearly interpolate 9 more points between the original example and the perturbed,
and plot their logit margin losses. In each sub-figure, the horizontal axis is the relative position
of the interpolated example: e.g. 0.0 represents the original example, 1.0 represents the perturbed
example with  = 8/255, 0.5 represents the average of them. The vertical axis is the logit margin
loss. Recall that when LLMθ (x, y) < 0, the perturbation fails. As one can see, MMA-32-sd0 has
much more “flat” loss curves compared to PGD-8.
To alleviate this, we add an additional clean loss term to the MMA objective in Eq. (9) to lower the
loss on clean examples, so that the input space loss landscape is steeper. Figure 3c shows that this
is indeed effective. Most of the loss curves are more tilted, and the losses of perturbed examples
are lower. Accordingly, MMAC-32-sd0 reduces its TransferGap at  = 8/255 to 3.02%, compared
to the no-additional-clean-loss MMA-32-sd0, which has a TransferGap of 7.39%.
An interesting observation is that, for MMA trained models trained on CIFAR10, adding additional
clean loss results in a decrease in clean accuracy and an increase in the average robust accuracy,
e.g. MMA-32-sd0 has ClnAcc 86.11%, and AvgRobAcc 28.36%, whereas MMAC-32-sd0 has ClnAcc
84.36%, and AvgRobAcc 29.39%. The fact that “adding additional clean loss results in a model
with lower accuracy and more robustness” seems counter-intuitive. However, it actually confirms
our motivation and reasoning of the additional clean loss: it makes the input space loss landscape
steeper, which leads to stronger adversaries at training time, which in turn poses more emphasis on
“robustness training”, instead of clean accuracy training.
We also note that TransferGaps for both MNIST-`∞ and `2 cases are almost nonexistent for the
MMA trained models, indicating that TransferGaps, observed on CIFAR10 cases, are not solely due
to the MMA algorithm, data distributions (MNIST vs CIFAR10) also play an important role.
5.3 Margin Maximization
Our previous analyses suggest that 1) MMA training enlarges margins of all training points, and
2) PGD training, by minimizing the adversarial loss with a fixed , would fail to enlarge margins
for points with inintial margins smaller than . This is because when dθ(x, y) < , PGD training is
maximizing an upper bound of dθ(x, y), which may not necessarily increase the margin, as discussed
in Section 3.1. To verify them, we track how margin distributions change during training processes.
Specifically, we randomly select 500 training points, and measure their margins at the checkpoint
saved after each training epoch. We use the norm of the perturbation, generated by 1000-step
DDN attack (Rony et al., 2018), to approximate the margin. We compare MMAC-3.0-sd0 and
PGD-2.5, under the CIFAR10-`2 case. 4 The results are shown in Figure 4, where each subplot is
a histogram (rotated by 90◦) of margin values. For the convenience of comparing across epochs, we
4We choose CIFAR10-`2 for this subsection, because the DDN attack is both fast and effective for estimating
margins. We are not aware of a `∞ counter part at this moment.
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Table 1: Accuracies of representative models trained on CIFAR10 with `∞-norm constrained attacks.
These robust accuracies are calculated under combined (whitebox+transfer) PGD attacks. AvgAcc
averages over clean and all robust accuracies; AvgRobAcc averages over all robust accuracies.
CIFAR10
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
RobAcc under different , combined (whitebox+transfer) attacks
4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
PGD-8 85.14 27.27 20.03 67.73 46.47 26.63 12.33 4.69 1.56 0.62 0.22
PGD-16 68.86 28.28 23.21 57.99 46.09 33.64 22.73 13.37 7.01 3.32 1.54
PGD-24 10.90 9.95 9.83 10.60 10.34 10.11 10.00 9.89 9.69 9.34 8.68
PGDLS-8 85.63 27.20 19.90 67.96 46.19 26.19 12.22 4.51 1.48 0.44 0.21
PGDLS-16 70.68 28.44 23.16 59.43 47.00 33.64 21.72 12.66 6.54 2.98 1.31
PGDLS-24 58.36 26.53 22.55 49.05 41.13 32.10 23.76 15.70 9.66 5.86 3.11
MMAC-12-sd0 88.59 26.87 19.15 67.96 43.42 24.07 11.45 4.27 1.43 0.45 0.16
MMAC-20-sd0 86.56 28.86 21.65 66.92 46.89 29.83 16.55 8.14 3.25 1.17 0.43
MMAC-32-sd0 84.36 29.39 22.51 64.82 47.18 31.49 18.91 10.16 4.77 1.97 0.81
MMA-32-sd0 86.11 28.36 21.14 66.02 46.31 28.88 15.98 7.44 2.94 1.12 0.45
PGD-ens 87.38 28.10 20.69 64.59 46.95 28.88 15.10 6.35 2.35 0.91 0.39
PGDLS-ens 76.73 29.52 23.62 60.52 48.21 35.06 22.14 12.28 6.17 3.14 1.43
use the vertical axis to indicate margin value, and the horizontal axis for counts in the histogram.
The number below each subplot is the corresponding training epoch. Margins mostly concentrate
near 0 for both models at the beginning. As training progresses, both enlarge margins on average.
However, in PGD training, a portion of margins stay close to 0 across the training process. At the
same time, it also pushes some margins to be even higher than 2.5, 5 the  value that the PGD-2.5
model is trained for. MMA training, on the other hand, does not “give up” on those data points
with small margins. At the end of training, 37.8% of the data points for PGD-2.5 have margins
smaller than 0.05, while the same number for MMAC-3.0-sd0 is 20.4%. As such, PGD training
enlarges the margins of “easy data” which are already robust enough, but “gives up” on “hard data”
with small margins. Instead, MMA training pushes the margin of every data point, by finding the
proper . In general, when the attack magnitude is unknown, MMAC would be able to achieve a
better balance between small margins and large margins, and thus achieves a better balance among
adversarial attacks with various .
5.4 Overall Performances
From the first 3 columns in Table 1, we can see that MMAC is very stable to its hinge hyperparameter
dmax. When dmax is set to smaller values such as 12 and 20, MMA models attain robust accuracies
across different attacking magnitudes, with the best clean accuracy in the table. When dmax is large,
MMA training can still learn a reasonable model that is both accurate and robust. For MMAC-
32-sd0, although dmax is set to a “impossible-to-be-robust” level at 32/255, it still achieves 84.36%
clean accuracy and 47.18% robust accuracy at 8/255, and automatically “ignores” the demand to
be robust at larger ’s, including 20, 24, 28 and 32, as it might be infeasible due to the intrinsic
difficulty of the problem. In contrast, PGD and PGDLS trained models are more sensitive to
their fixed perturbation magnitude. We can see that PGD training does not converge under large
perturbation magnitude, e.g. with  = 24/255, as the accuracies at all test ’s are around 10%.
PGDLS-24 training does converge, but in order to gain more robustness, it largely sacrifices the
clean accuracy to only 58.36%. In terms of the overall performance, we notice that MMA training
with a large dmax, e.g. 20 or 32, achieves high AvgAcc values, e.g. 28.86% or 29.39%. However, for
5Probably because PGD training keeps maximizing lower bounds of these margins, as stated in Section 3.
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PGD(LS) training to achieve a similar performance,  needs to be carefully picked and their clean
accuracies suffer a significant drop.
Furthermore, MMA training also achieves similar performance compared to the ensemble PGD(LS)
models. PGD-ens maintains a good clean accuracy, but it is still marginally outperformed by
MMAC-32-sd0 w.r.t. robustness at varies ’s. On the other hand, PGDLS-ens gives a low clean
accuracy, but offers an average robust accuracy slightly higher than MMAC-32-sd0. Further note
that 1) the ensemble models require significantly higher computation costs both at training and
test times; 2) Attacking an ensembled model is still relatively unexplored in the literature, thus
our whitebox PGD attacks on the ensembles may not be sufficiently effective; 6 and 3) as shown
in Appendix G, for MNIST-`∞/`2, MMA trained models significantly outperform the PGD(LS)
ensemble models.
6Attacks on ensembles are explained in Appendix F.
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Appendix
A Additional Theoretical Analyses
A.1 Margin Maximization for Non-smooth Loss and Norm
We continue from Section 2.2.
For simplicity, consider a K-layers fully-connected ReLU network, f(θ;x) = fθ(x) as a function of
θ.
f(θ;x) = V >DKWKDK−1WK−1 · · ·D1W>Kx (10)
where the Dk are diagnal matrices dependent on ReLU’s activation pattern over the layers, and
Wk’s and V are the weights (i.e. θ). Note that f(θ;x) is a piecewise polynomial functions of θ with
finitely many pieces. We further define the directional derivative of a function g, along the direction
of ~v, to be:
g′(θ;~v) := lim
t↓0
g(θ + t~v)− g(θ)
t
.
Note that for every direction ~v, there exists α > 0 such that f(θ;x) is a polynomial restricted to a
line segment [θ, θ + α~v]. Thus the above limit exists and the directional derivative is well defined.
We first show the existence of ~v and t for l(θ0 +t~v) given any . Let lθ0,~v,(t) := sup‖δ‖≤ L(δ, θ0 +t~v).
Proposition A.1. For  > 0, t ∈ [0, 1], and θ0 ∈ Θ, there exists a direction ~v ∈ Θ, such that the
derivative of lθ0,~v,(t) exists and is negative. Moreover, it is given by
l′θ0,~v,(t) = L
′(δ∗, θ0;~v).
Therefore, for any  > 0, if θ0 is not a local minimum, then there exits a direction d, such that for
θ1 = θ0 + t~v for a proper t,
sup
‖δ‖≤
L(δ, θ0 + t~v) < sup
‖δ‖≤
L(δ, θ0) . (11)
Our next proposition provides an alternative way to increase the margin of fθ.
Proposition A.2. Assume fθ0 has a margin 0, and θ1 such that lθ0,~v,0(t) ≤ lθ1,~v,0(0) , then fθ1
has a larger margin than 0.
Therefore, the update θ0 → θ1 = θ0 + t~v increases the margin of fθ.
A.2 Understanding Adversarial Training through Margin Maximization
We continue from Section 3. Our next two results show that MMA training is essentially doing
adversarial training with the “correct” margin for each individual example.
Theorem A.1. Let θMMA = arg maxθ minL(δ,θ)≥ρ ‖δ‖, with the assumption that ρ ≥ L(0, θ) ∈
Range(L(δ, θ)). Also let θadv = arg minθ max‖δ‖≤∗ L(δ, θ), and ∗ = minL(δ,θMMA)≥ρ ‖δ‖, then θMMA
also minimizes the adversarial loss, i.e.
max
‖δ‖≤∗
L(δ, θMMA) = max‖δ‖≤∗
L(δ, θadv).
Our next theorem shows that if  is picked “tightly”, then the optimal f that minimizes the adver-
sarial loss also maximizes the margin given the corresponding threshold ρ∗.
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Theorem A.2. Let θadv = arg minθ max‖δ‖≤ L(δ, θ), with  ≥ 0. Also let ρ∗ = max‖δ‖≤ L(δ, θadv),
and θMMA = arg maxθ minL(δ,θ)≥ρ∗ ‖δ‖. Further assume that
min
L(δ,θadv)≥ρ∗
‖δ‖ = , (No overshooting assumption)
then θadv also maximizes the margin distance, i.e.
min
L(δ,θadv)≥ρ∗
‖δ‖ = min
L(δ,θMMA)≥ρ∗
‖δ‖.
Theorems A.1 and A.2 suggest that:
MMA training can also be interpreted as a way of improving adversarial training by finding
the proper  for each training sample, which is exactly the flavor of Algorithm 2.
A.3 Understanding Adversarial Training through Margin Maximization
Recall Eq. (6):
LSLMθ (x, y)− log(K − 1) ≤ LLMθ (x, y) ≤ LSLMθ (x, y)
This is because
LLMθ (x, y) = (max
j 6=y
f jθ (x))− fyθ (x) (12)
= log(exp(max
j 6=y
f jθ (x)))− fyθ (x) (13)
≤ log(exp(
∑
j 6=y
f jθ (x)))− fyθ (x) (14)
= LSLMθ (x, y) (15)
≤ log((K − 1) exp(max
j 6=y
f jθ (x)))− fyθ (x) (16)
= log(K − 1) + (max
j 6=y
f jθ (x))− fyθ (x) (17)
= log(K − 1) + LLMθ (x, y) (18)
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of theorem 2.1
Proof. Recall (δ) = ‖δ‖. Here we compute the gradient for dθ(x, y) in its general form. Consider
the following optimization problem:
dθ(x, y) = min
δ∈∆(θ)
(δ),
where ∆(θ) = {δ : Lθ(x+ δ, y) = 0},  and L(δ, θ) are both C2 functions 7. Denotes its Lagrangian
by L(δ, λ), where
L(δ, λ) = (δ) + λLθ(x+ δ, y)
7Note that a simple application of Danskin’s theorem would not be valid as the constraint set ∆(θ) depends on
the parameter θ.
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For a fixed θ, the optimizer δ∗ and λ∗ must satisfy the first-order conditions (FOC)
∂(δ)
∂δ
+ λ
∂Lθ(x+ δ, y)
∂δ
∣∣∣∣
δ=δ∗,λ=λ∗
= 0, (19)
Lθ(x+ δ, y)|δ=δ∗ = 0.
Put the FOC equations in vector form,
G((δ, λ), θ) =
(
∂(δ)
∂δ + λ
∂Lθ(x+δ,y)
∂δ
Lθ(x+ δ, y)
) ∣∣∣∣
δ=δ∗,λ=λ∗
= 0.
Note that G is C1 continuously differentiable since  and L(δ, θ) are C2 functions. Furthermore, the
Jacobian matrix of G w.r.t (δ, λ) is
∇(δ,λ)G((δ∗, λ∗), θ)
=
(
∂2(δ∗)
∂δ2
+ λ∗ ∂
2L(δ∗,L(δ,θ))
∂δ2
∂L(δ∗,θ)
∂δ
∂L(δ∗,θ)
∂δ
>
0
)
which by assumption is full rank. Therefore, by the implicit function theorem, δ∗ and λ∗ can be
expressed as a function of θ, denoted by δ∗(θ) and λ∗(θ).
To further compute ∇θdθ(x, y), note that dθ(x, y) = (δ∗(θ)). Thus,
∇θdθ(x, y) = ∂(δ
∗)
∂δ
∂δ∗(θ)
∂θ
= −λ∗∂L(δ
∗, θ)
∂δ
∂δ∗(θ)
∂θ
, (20)
where the second equality is by Eq. (19). The implicit function theorem also provides a way of
computing ∂δ
∗(θ)
∂θ which is complicated involving taking inverse of the matrix ∇(δ,λ)G((δ∗, λ∗), θ).
Here we present a relatively simple way to compute this gradient. Note that by the definition of
δ∗(θ),
L(δ∗(θ), θ) ≡ 0.
and δ∗(θ) is a differentiable implicit function of θ restricted to this level set. Differentiate with w.r.t.
θ on both sides:
∂L(δ∗, θ)
∂θ
+
∂L(δ∗, θ)
∂δ
∂δ∗(θ)
∂θ
= 0. (21)
Combining Eq. (20) and Eq. (21),
∇θdθ(x, y) = λ∗(θ)∂L(δ
∗, θ)
∂θ
. (22)
Lastly, note that ∥∥∥∥∥∂(δ)∂δ + λ∂Lθ(x+ δ, y)∂δ
∣∣∣∣
δ=δ∗,λ=λ∗
∥∥∥∥∥
2
= 0.
Therefore, one way to calculate λ∗(θ) is by
λ∗(θ) =
∂(δ)
∂δ
> ∂Lθ(x+δ,y)
∂δ
∂Lθ(x+δ,y)
∂δ
> ∂Lθ(x+δ,y)
∂δ
∣∣∣∣∣
δ=δ∗
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B.2 A lemma for later proofs
The following lemma helps relate the objective of adversarial training with that of our MMA training.
Here, we denote Lθ(x+ δ, y) as L(δ, θ) for simplicity.
Lemma B.1. Given (x, y) and θ , assume that L(δ, θ) is continuous in δ, then for  ≥ 0, and
ρ ≥ L(0, θ) ∈ Range(L(δ, θ)), it holds that
min
L(δ,θ)≥ρ
‖δ‖ =  =⇒ max
‖δ‖≤
L(δ, θ) = ρ ; (23)
max
‖δ‖≤
L(δ, θ) = ρ =⇒ min
L(δ,θ)≥ρ
‖δ‖ ≤  . (24)
Proof. Eq. (23). We prove this by contradiction. Suppose max‖δ‖≤ L(δ, θ) > ρ. When  = 0, this
violates our asssumption ρ ≥ L(0, θ) in the theorem. So assume  > 0. Since L(δ, θ) is a continuous
function defined on a compact set, the maximum is attained by δ¯ such that ‖δ¯‖ ≤  and L(δ¯, θ) > ρ.
Note that L(δ, θ)) is continuous and ρ ≥ L(0, θ), then there exists δ˜ ∈ 〈0, δ¯〉 i.e. the line segment
connecting 0 and δ¯, such that ‖δ˜‖ <  and L(δ˜, θ) = ρ. This follows from the intermediate value
theorem by restricting L(δ, θ) onto 〈0, δ¯〉. This contradicts minL(δ,θ)≥ρ ‖δ‖ = .
If max‖δ‖≤ L(δ, θ) < ρ, then {δ : ‖δ‖ ≤ } ⊂ {δ : L(δ, θ) < ρ}. Every point p ∈ {δ : ‖δ‖ ≤ } is
in the open set {δ : L(δ, θ) < ρ}, there exists an open ball with some radius rp centered at p such
that Brp ⊂ {δ : L(δ, θ) < ρ}. This forms an open cover for {δ : ‖δ‖ ≤ }. Since {δ : ‖δ‖ ≤ } is
compact, there is an open finite subcover U such that: {δ : ‖δ‖ ≤ } ⊂ U ⊂ {δ : L(δ, θ) < ρ}.
Since U is finite, there exists h > 0 such that {δ : ‖δ‖ ≤  + h} ⊂ {δ : L(δ, θ) < ρ}. Thus
{δ : L(δ, θ) ≥ ρ} ⊂ {δ : ‖δ‖ > + h}, contradicting minL(δ,θ)≥ρ ‖δ‖ =  again.
Eq. (24). Assume that minL(δ,θ)≥ρ ‖δ‖ > , then {δ : L(δ, θ) ≥ ρ} ⊂ {δ : ‖δ‖ > }. Taking
complementary set of both sides, {δ : ‖δ‖ ≤ } ⊂ {δ : L(δ, θ) < ρ}. Therefore, by the compactness
of {δ : ‖δ‖ ≤ }, max‖δ‖≤ L(δ, θ) < ρ, contradiction.
B.3 Proof of theorem A.1
Proof. By the definition of θadv,
max
‖δ‖≤∗
L(δ, θMMA) ≥ max‖δ‖≤∗ L(δ, θadv).
We further prove it is not possible that
max
‖δ‖≤∗
L(δ, θMMA) > max‖δ‖≤∗
L(δ, θadv).
If so, by the first implication in Lemma B.1 and the definition of ∗, we have
ρ = max
‖δ‖≤∗
L(δ, θMMA) > max‖δ‖≤∗
L(δ, θadv),
and thus with similar arguments to the proof of Lemma B.1,
min
L(δ,θadv)≥ρ
‖δ‖ > ∗ = ‖δ∗(θMMA)‖,
contradicting the definition of θMMA. Therefore,
max
‖δ‖≤∗
L(δ, θMMA) = max‖δ‖≤∗
L(δ, θadv).
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B.4 Proof of Theorem A.2
Proof. By the definition of θMMA,
min
L(δ,θMMA)≥ρ∗
‖δ‖ ≥ min
L(δ,θadv)≥ρ∗
‖δ‖.
We further prove it is not possible that
min
L(δ,θMMA)≥ρ∗
‖δ‖ > min
L(δ,θadv)≥ρ∗
‖δ‖.
If so, by the no overshooting assumption,
min
L(δ,θMMA)≥ρ∗
‖δ‖ > .
and thus with similar arguments to the proof of the second implication in Lemma B.1,
max
‖δ‖≤
L(δ, θMMA) < ρ
∗,
contradicting the definition of θadv. Therefore,
max
‖δ‖≤∗
L(δ, θMMA) = max‖δ‖≤∗
L(δ, θadv).
B.5 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Since θ0 is not a local minimum, there exists a direction d, such that L′(δ∗, θ0;~v) =
∂L(δ∗,θ0+t~v)
∂t is
negative. The next theorem provides a way to compute the directional gradient along this direction
~v.
Theorem B.1 (Danskin). Fix a direction ~v ∈ Θ,  > 0, t ∈ [0, 1] and θ0 ∈ Θ. Let lθ0,~v,(t) :=
sup‖δ‖≤ L(δ, θ0 + t~v). Then the derivative of lθ0,~v,(t) exists and is given by:
l′θ0,~v,(t) = L
′(δ∗, θ0;~v).
Proof. [Proof sketch] We basically apply a version of Danskin theorem for directional absolutely
continuous maps and semi-continuous maps (Yu, 2012). 1. the constraint set {δ : ‖δ‖ ≤ } is
compact; 2. L(θ0 + t~v;x+δ, y) is piecewise Lipschitz and hence absolutely continuous (an induction
argument on the integral representation over the finite pieces). 3. L(θ0 + t~v;x+ δ, y) is continuous
on both δ and along the direction ~v and hence upper semi continuous. Hence we can apply Theorem
1 in Yu (2012).
B.6 Proof of Proposition A.2
Since fθ0 has a margin 0, thus
max
‖δ‖≤0
L(θ0;x+ δ, y) = 0
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Further by lθ0,~v,0(t) ≤ lθ0,~v,0(0) ,
sup
‖δ‖≤
L(δ, θ0 + t~v) ≤ sup
‖δ‖≤
L(δ, θ0).
To see the equality (constraint not binding), we use the following argument. The envolope function’s
continuity is passed from the continuity of L(θ0;x + δ, y). The inverse image of a closed set under
continuous function is closed. If δ∗ lies in the interior of max‖δ‖≤0 L~v,(θ0;x+ δ, y) ≥ 0, we would
have a contradiction. Therefore the constraint is not binding, due to the continuity of the envolope
function. By Eq. (11), max‖δ‖≤0 L(θ1;x + δ, y) < 0. So for the parameter θ1, fθ1 has a margin
1 > 0.
C More Related Works
We next discuss a few related works in details.
First-order Large Margin: Previous works (Elsayed et al., 2018; Sokolic et al., 2017; Matyasko
and Chau, 2017) have attempted to use first-order approximation to estimate the input space
margin. For first-order methods, the margin will be accurately estimated when the classification
function is linear. MMA’s margin estimation is exact when the shortest successful perturbation δ∗
can be solved, which is not only satisfied by linear models, but also by a broader range of models,
e.g. models that are convex w.r.t. input x. This relaxed condition could potentially enable more
accurate margin estimation which improves MMA training’s performance.
(Cross-)Lipschitz Regularization: Tsuzuku et al. (2018) enlarges their margin by controlling
the global Lipschitz constant, which in return places a strong constraint on the model and harms
its learning capabilities. Instead, our method, alike adversarial training, uses adversarial attacks
to estimate the margin to the decision boundary. With a strong method, our estimate is much
more precise in the neighborhood around the data point, while being much more flexible due to not
relying on a global Lipschitz constraint.
Hard-Margin SVM (Vapnik, 2013) in the separable case: Assuming that all the training
examples are correctly classified and using our notations on general classifiers, the hard-margin
SVM objective can be written as:
max
θ
{
min
i
dθ(zi)
}
s.t. Lθ(zi) < 0, ∀i . (25)
On the other hand, under the same “separable and correct” assumptions, MMA formulation in
Eq. (8) can be written as
max
θ
{∑
i
dθ(zi)
}
s.t. Lθ(zi) < 0,∀i , (26)
which is maximizing the average margin rather than the minimum margin in SVM. Note that the
theorem on gradient calculation of the margin in Section 2.1 also applies to the SVM formulation
of differentiable functions. Because of this, we can also use SGD to solve the following “SVM-style”
formulation:
max
θ
mini∈S+θ dθ(zi)−
∑
j∈S−θ
Jθ(zj)
 . (27)
As our focus is using MMA to improve adversarial robustness which involves maximizing the average
margin, we delay the maximization of minimum margin to future work.
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Algorithm 1 Adaptive Norm PGD Attack for approximately solving δ∗.
Inputs: (x, y) is the data example. init is the initial norm constraint used in the first PGD attack.
Outputs: δ∗, approximate shortest successful perturbation.
Parameters: max is the maximum perturbation length. PGD(x, y, ) represents PGD (Madry
et al., 2017) perturbation δ with maximum perturbation length .
1: Adversarial example δ1 = PGD(x, y, init)
2: Unit perturbation δu = δ1‖δ1‖
3: if prediction on x+ δ1 is correct then
4: ′ =
∥∥arg minη |L(x+ ηδu, y)|∥∥ , η ∈ [init, max]
5: else
6: ′ =
∥∥arg minη |L(x+ ηδu, y)|∥∥ , η ∈ [0, init)
7: end if
8: δ∗ = ′δu
C.1 Comparison with Adversarial Training with DDN
For `2 robustness, we also compare to models adversarially trained on the “Decoupled Direction
and Norm” (DDN) attack (Rony et al., 2018), which is concurrent to our work. DDN attack aims
to achieve successful perturbation with minimal `2 norm, which makes DDN based adversarial
training very similar to our MMA training. In fact, DDN attack could be a drop-in replacement
for the AN-PGD attack for MMA training. We performed evaluations on the downloaded 8 DDN
trained models.
The DDN MNIST model is a larger ConvNet with similar structure to our LeNet5, and the CIFAR10
model is wideresnet-28-10, which is similar but larger than the wideresnet-28-4 that we use.
DDN training is very similar to MMA training with a few differences. DDN training is “training on
adversarial examples generated by the DDN attack”. When DDN attack does not find a successful
adversarial example, it returns the clean image, and the model will use it for training. In MMA,
when a successful adversarial example cannot be found, it is treated as a perturbation with very large
magnitude, we will be ignored by the hinge loss when we calculate gradient for this example. Also
in DDN training, there exist a maximum norm of the perturbation. This maximum norm constraint
does not exist for MMA training. When a perturbation is larger than the hinge threshold, it will
be ignored by the hinge loss. There are also a few differences in training hyperparameters, which
we refer the reader to Rony et al. (2018) for details.
Despite these differences, in our experiments MMA training achieves similar performances under
the `2 cases. While DDN attack and training only focus on `2 cases, we also show that the MMA
training framework provides significant improvements over PGD training in the `∞ case.
D MMA Training Algorithms
Algorithm 1 describes the Adaptive Norm PGD Attack (AN-PGD) algorithm. Note that we denote
the zero-crossing binary search as arg minη |L(η)| for brevity. Algorithm 2 describes the detailed
MMA training algorithm.
8github.com/jeromerony/fast_adversarial
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Algorithm 2 Max-Margin Adversarial Training.
Inputs: The training set {(xi, yi)}.
Outputs: the trained neural network model fθ(·).
Parameters:  contains perturbation lengths of training data. min is the minimum perturbation
length. max is the maximum perturbation length. A(x, y, init) represents the approximate shortest
successful perturbation returned by an algorithm A (e.g. AN-PGD) on the data example (x, y) and
at the initial norm init.
1: Randomly initialize the parameter θ of model f , and initialize every element of  as min
2: repeat
3: Read minibatch B = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym)}
4: Make predictions on B and into two: wrongly predicted B0 and correctly predicted B1
5: for (xi, yi) in B1 do
6: Retrieve perturbation length i from 
7: δ∗i = A(xi, yi, i)
8: Update the i in  as ‖δ∗i ‖, and put (xi + δ∗i , yi) into Badv1
9: end for
10: Calculate the gradient of margin on Badv1 and the gradient of classification loss on B0 (Eq. (9))
11: Perform one step gradient step update on θ
12: until meet training stopping criterion
E Detailed Settings for Training
We train LeNet5 models for the MNIST experiments and use wide residual networks (Zagoruyko
and Komodakis, 2016) with depth 28 and widen factor 4 for all the CIFAR10 experiments. For all
the experiments, we monitor the average margin from AN-PGD on the validation set and choose the
model with largest average margin from the sequence of checkpoints during training. The validation
set contains first 5000 images of training set. It is only used to monitor training progress and not
used in training. Here all the models are trained and tested under the same type of norm constraints,
namely if trained on `∞, then tested on `∞; if trained on `2, then tested on `2.
The LeNet5 is composed of 32-channel conv filter + ReLU + size 2 max pooling + 64-channel conv
filter + ReLU + size 2 max pooling + fc layer with 1024 units + ReLU + fc layer with 10 output
classes. We do not preprocess MNIST images before feeding into the model.
For training LeNet5 on all MNIST experiments, for both PGD and MMA training, we use the Adam
optimizer with an initial learning rate of 0.0001 and train for 100000 steps with batch size 50. In
our initial experiments, we tested different initial learning rate at 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, and 0.1 and
do not find noticeable differences.
We use the WideResNet-28-4 as described in Zagoruyko and Komodakis (2016) for our experiments,
where 28 is the depth and 4 is the widen factor. We use “per image standardization” 9 to preprocess
CIFAR10 images, following Madry et al. (2017).
For training WideResNet on CIFAR10 variants, we use stochastic gradient descent with momentum
0.9 and weight decay 0.0002. We train 50000 steps in total with batch size 128. The learning rate is
set to 0.3 at step 0, 0.09 at step 20000, 0.03 at step 30000, and 0.009 at step 40000. This setting is
9Description can be found at https://www.tensorflow.org/api_docs/python/tf/image/per_image_
standardization. We implemented our own version in PyTorch.
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the same for PGD and MMA training. In our initial experiments, we tested different learning rate
at 0.03, 0.1, 0.3, and 0.6, and kept using 0.3 for all our later experiments. We also tested a longer
training schedule, following Madry et al. (2017), where we train 80000 steps with different learning
rate schedules. We did not observe improvement with this longer training, therefore kept using the
50000 steps training.
For models trained on MNIST, we use 40-step PGD attack with the soft logit margin (SLM) loss
defined in Section 3, for CIFAR10 we use 10 step-PGD, also with the SLM loss. For both MNIST
and CIFAR10, the step size of PGD attack at training time is 2.5number of steps · In AN-PGD, we always
perform 10 step binary search after PGD, with the SLM loss. For AN-PGD, the maximum pertur-
bation length is always 1.05 times the hinge threshold: max = 1.05dmax. The initial perturbation
length at the first epoch, init, have different values under different settings. init = 0.5 for MNIST
`2, init = 0.1 for MNIST `∞, init = 0.5 for CIFAR10 `2, init = 0.05 for CIFAR10 `2. In epochs
after the first, init will be set to the margin of the same example from last epoch.
For MNIST-`∞, we train PGD/PGDLS models with  = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.45, MMA/MMAC mod-
els with dmax = 0.45. For MNIST-`2, we train PGD/PGDLS models with  = 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0,
MMA/MMAC models with dmax = 2.0, 4.0, 6.0. For CIFAR10-`∞, we train PGD/PGDLS models
with  = 4, 8, 12, 16, 20, 24, 28, 32, MMA/MMAC models with dmax = 12, 20, 32. For CIFAR10-`2,
we train PGD/PGDLS models with  = 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5, MMA/MMAC models with dmax =
1.0, 2.0, 3.0.
With regard to ensemble models, for MNIST-`2 PGD/PGDLS-ens, CIFAR10-`2 PGD/PGDLS-ens,
MNIST-`∞PGDLS-ens, and CIFAR10-`∞ PGDLS-ens, they all use the PGD (or PGDLS) models
trained at all testing (attacking) ’s. For CIFAR10-`∞ PGD-ens, PGD-24,28,32 are excluded for
the same reason.
F Detailed Settings of Attacks
For both `∞ and `2 PGD attacks, we use the implementation from the AdverTorch toolbox (Ding
et al., 2019b). Regarding the loss function of PGD, we use both the cross-entropy (CE) loss and
the Carlini and Wagner (CW) loss. 10
As previously stated, each model with have N whitebox PGD attacks on them, N/2 of them are
CE-PGD attacks, and the other N/2 are CW-PGD attacks. Recall that N = 50 for MNIST and
N = 10 for CIFAR10. At test time, all the PGD attack run 100 iterations. We manually tune the
step size parameter on a few MMA and PGD models and then fix them thereafter. The step size
for MNIST-`∞ when  = 0.3 is 0.0075, the step size for CIFAR10-`∞ when  = 8/255 is 2/255, the
step size for MNIST-`2 when  = 1.0 is 0.25, the step size for CIFAR10-`2 when  = 1.0 is 0.25. For
other  values, the step size are linearly scaled accordingly.
The ensemble model we considered uses the majority vote for prediction, and uses softmax score
as the tie breaker. So it is not obvious how to perform CW-PGD and CE-PGD directly on them.
Here we take 2 strategies. The first one is a naive strategy, where we minimize the sum of losses of
all the models used in the ensemble. Here, similar to attacking single models, we CW and CE loss
here and perform the same number attacks.
10The CW loss is almost equivalent to the logit margin (LM) loss. We use CW loss for the ease of comparing with
literature. Here CW (x) = min{maxj 6=y fj(x) − fy(x), 0}. When the classification is correct, CW and LM loss have
the same gradient.
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The second strategy is still a PGD attack with a customized loss towards attacking ensemble models.
For the group of classifiers in the ensemble, at each PGD step, if less than half of the classifiers
give wrong classification, when we sum up the CW losses from correct classifiers as the loss for
PGD attacking. If more than half of the classifier give wrong classification, then we find the
wrong prediction that appeared most frequently among classifiers, and denote it as label0, with
its corresponding logit, logit0. For each classifier, we then find the largest logit that is not logit0,
denoted as logit1. The loss we maximize, in the PGD attack, is the sum of “logit1 - logit0” from
each classifier. Using this strategy, we perform additional (compared to attacking single models)
whitebox PGD attacks on ensemble models. For MNIST, we perform 50 repeated attacks, for
CIFAR10 we perform 10. These are also 100-step PGD attacks.
We expect more carefully designed attacks could work better on ensembles, but we delay it to future
work.
For the SPSA attack (Uesato et al., 2018), we run the attack for 100 iterations with perturbation size
0.01 (for gradient estimation), Adam learning rate 0.01, stopping threshold -5.0 and 2048 samples
for each gradient estimate. For CIFAR10-`∞, we use  = 8/255. For MNIST-`∞, we use  = 0.3.
G Full Results and Tables
We present all the empirical results in Table 2 to 13. Specifically, we show model performances
under combined (whitebox+transfer) attacks in Tables 2 to 5. This is our proxy for true robustness
measure. We show model performances under only whitebox PGD attacks in Tables 6 to 9. We
show TransferGaps in Tables 10 to 13.
In these tables, PGD-Madry et al. models are the “secret” models downloaded from https://
github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge and https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge/.
DDN-Rony et al. models are downloaded from https://github.com/jeromerony/fast_adversarial/.
For MNIST PGD-Madry et al. models, our whitebox attacks brings the robust accuracy at  = 0.3
down to 89.79%, which is at the same level with the reported 89.62% on the website, also with 50
repeated random initialized PGD attacks. For CIFAR10 PGD-Madry et al. models, our whitebox
attacks brings the robust accuracy at  = 8/255 down to 44.70%, which is stronger than the
reported 45.21% on the website, with 10 repeated random initialized 20-step PGD attacks. As our
PGD attacks are 100-step, this is not surprising.
As we mentioned previously, DDN training can be seen as a specific instantiation of the general
MMA training idea, and the DDN-Rony et al. models indeed performs very similar to MMA trained
models when dmax is set relatively low. Therefore, we do not discuss the performance of DDN-Rony
et al. separately.
In Section 5, we have mainly discussed different phenomena under the case of CIFAR10-`∞. For
CIFAR10-`2, we see very similar patterns in Tables 5, 9 and 13. These include
• MMA training is fairly stable to dmax, and achieves good robustness-accuracy trade-offs. On
the other hand, to achieve good AvgRobAcc, PGD/PGDLS trained models need to have large
sacrifices on clean accuracies.
• Adding additional clean loss increases the robustness of the model, reduce TransferGap, at a
cost of slightly reducing clean accuracy.
As a simpler datasets, different adversarial training algorithms, including MMA training, have very
different behaviors on MNIST as compared to CIFAR10.
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We first look at MNIST-`∞. Similar to CIFAR10 cases, PGD training is incompetent on large
’s, e.g. PGD-0.4 has significant drop on clean accuracy (to 96.64%) and PGD-0.45 fails to train.
PGDLS training, on the other hand, is able to handle large ’s training very well on MNIST-`∞,
and MMA training does not bring extra benefit on top of PGDLS. We suspect that this is due to
the “easiness” of this specific task on MNIST, where finding proper  for each individual example is
not necessary, and a global scheduling of  is enough. We note that this phenomenon confirms our
understanding of adversarial training from the margin maximization perspective in Section 3.
Under the case of MNIST-`2, we notice that MMA training almost does not need to sacrifice clean
accuracy in order to get higher robustness. All the models with dmax ≥ 4.0 behaves similarly w.r.t.
both clean and robust accuracies. Achieving 40% robust accuracy at  = 3.0 seems to be the
robustness limit of MMA trained models. On the other hand, PGD/PGDLS models are able to get
higher robustness at  = 3.0 with robust accuracy of 44.5%, although with some sacrifices to clean
accuracy. This is similar to what we have observed in the case of CIFAR10.
We notice that on both MNIST-`∞ and MNIST-`2, unlike CIFAR10 cases, PGD(LS)-ens model
performs poorly in terms of robustness. This is likely due to that PGD trained models on MNIST
usually have a very sharp robustness drop when the  used for attacking is larger than the  used
for training.
Another significant differences between MNIST cases and CIFAR10 cases is that TransferGaps are
very small for MMA/MMAC trained models on MNIST cases. This again is likely due to that
MNIST is an “easier” dataset. It also indicates that the TransferGap is not purely due to the
MMA training algorithm, it is also largely affected by the property of datasets. Although previous
literature (Ding et al., 2019a; Zhang et al., 2019) also discusses related topics on the difference
between MNIST and CIFAR10 w.r.t. adversarial robustness, they do not directly explain the
observed phenomena here. We delay a thorough understanding of this topic to future work.
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Table 2: Accuracies of models trained on MNIST with `∞-norm constrained attacks. These robust
accuracies are calculated under both combined (whitebox+transfer) PGD attacks.
MNIST
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
RobAcc under different , combined (whitebox+transfer) attacks
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
STD 99.21 35.02 18.97 73.58 2.31 0.00 0.00
PGD-0.1 99.40 48.85 36.22 96.35 48.51 0.01 0.00
PGD-0.2 99.22 57.92 47.60 97.44 92.12 0.84 0.00
PGD-0.3 98.96 76.97 71.47 97.90 96.00 91.76 0.22
PGD-0.4 96.64 89.37 87.55 94.69 91.57 86.49 77.47
PGD-0.45 11.35 11.35 11.35 11.35 11.35 11.35 11.35
PGDLS-0.1 99.43 46.85 33.71 95.41 39.42 0.00 0.00
PGDLS-0.2 99.38 58.36 48.10 97.38 89.49 5.53 0.00
PGDLS-0.3 99.10 76.56 70.93 97.97 95.66 90.09 0.00
PGDLS-0.4 98.98 93.07 91.59 98.12 96.29 93.01 78.96
PGDLS-0.45 98.89 94.74 93.70 97.91 96.34 93.29 87.28
MMA-0.45-sd0 98.98 93.94 92.68 97.90 96.05 92.35 84.41
MMA-0.45-sd1 99.02 94.03 92.78 97.93 96.02 92.44 84.73
MMAC-0.45-sd0 98.95 94.13 92.93 97.87 96.01 92.59 85.24
MMAC-0.45-sd1 98.90 94.04 92.82 97.82 96.00 92.63 84.83
PGD-ens 99.28 57.98 47.65 97.25 89.99 3.37 0.00
PGDLS-ens 99.34 59.04 48.96 97.48 90.40 7.96 0.00
PGD-Madry et al. 98.53 76.04 70.41 97.08 94.83 89.64 0.11
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Table 3: Accuracies of models trained on CIFAR10 with `∞-norm constrained attacks. These robust
accuracies are calculated under both combined (whitebox+transfer) PGD attacks.
CIFAR10
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
RobAcc under different , combined (whitebox+transfer) attacks
4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
STD 94.92 10.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PGD-4 90.44 22.95 14.51 66.31 33.49 12.22 3.01 0.75 0.24 0.06 0.01
PGD-8 85.14 27.27 20.03 67.73 46.47 26.63 12.33 4.69 1.56 0.62 0.22
PGD-12 77.86 28.51 22.34 63.88 48.22 32.13 18.67 9.48 4.05 1.56 0.70
PGD-16 68.86 28.28 23.21 57.99 46.09 33.64 22.73 13.37 7.01 3.32 1.54
PGD-20 61.06 27.34 23.12 51.72 43.13 33.73 24.55 15.66 9.05 4.74 2.42
PGD-24 10.90 9.95 9.83 10.60 10.34 10.11 10.00 9.89 9.69 9.34 8.68
PGD-28 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
PGD-32 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
PGDLS-4 89.87 22.39 13.96 63.98 31.92 11.47 3.32 0.68 0.16 0.08 0.05
PGDLS-8 85.63 27.20 19.90 67.96 46.19 26.19 12.22 4.51 1.48 0.44 0.21
PGDLS-12 79.39 28.45 22.08 64.62 48.08 31.34 17.86 8.69 3.95 1.48 0.65
PGDLS-16 70.68 28.44 23.16 59.43 47.00 33.64 21.72 12.66 6.54 2.98 1.31
PGDLS-20 65.81 27.60 22.83 54.96 44.39 33.13 22.53 13.80 7.79 4.08 1.95
PGDLS-24 58.36 26.53 22.55 49.05 41.13 32.10 23.76 15.70 9.66 5.86 3.11
PGDLS-28 50.07 24.20 20.97 40.71 34.61 29.00 22.77 16.83 11.49 7.62 4.73
PGDLS-32 38.80 19.88 17.52 26.16 24.96 23.22 19.96 16.22 12.92 9.82 6.88
MMA-12-sd0 88.52 26.31 18.54 66.96 42.58 23.22 10.29 3.43 1.24 0.46 0.13
MMA-12-sd1 87.82 26.24 18.54 66.23 43.10 23.57 10.32 3.56 1.04 0.38 0.14
MMAC-12-sd0 88.59 26.87 19.15 67.96 43.42 24.07 11.45 4.27 1.43 0.45 0.16
MMAC-12-sd1 88.91 26.23 18.39 67.08 42.97 22.57 9.76 3.37 0.92 0.35 0.12
MMA-20-sd0 87.06 27.41 19.95 66.54 45.39 26.29 13.09 5.32 1.96 0.79 0.23
MMA-20-sd1 87.44 27.77 20.31 66.28 45.60 27.33 14.00 6.04 2.23 0.74 0.25
MMAC-20-sd0 86.56 28.86 21.65 66.92 46.89 29.83 16.55 8.14 3.25 1.17 0.43
MMAC-20-sd1 85.87 28.72 21.57 65.44 46.11 29.96 17.30 8.27 3.60 1.33 0.56
MMA-32-sd0 86.11 28.36 21.14 66.02 46.31 28.88 15.98 7.44 2.94 1.12 0.45
MMA-32-sd1 86.36 28.75 21.55 66.86 47.12 29.63 16.09 7.56 3.38 1.31 0.47
MMAC-32-sd0 84.36 29.39 22.51 64.82 47.18 31.49 18.91 10.16 4.77 1.97 0.81
MMAC-32-sd1 84.76 29.08 22.11 64.41 45.95 30.36 18.24 9.85 4.99 2.20 0.92
PGD-ens 87.38 28.10 20.69 64.59 46.95 28.88 15.10 6.35 2.35 0.91 0.39
PGDLS-ens 76.73 29.52 23.62 60.52 48.21 35.06 22.14 12.28 6.17 3.14 1.43
PGD-Madry et al. 87.14 27.22 19.73 68.01 44.68 25.03 12.15 5.18 1.95 0.64 0.23
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Table 4: Accuracies of models trained on MNIST with `2-norm constrained attacks. These robust
accuracies are calculated under both combined (whitebox+transfer) PGD attacks.
MNIST
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
RobAcc under different , combined (whitebox+transfer) attacks
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
STD 99.21 41.84 27.49 86.61 22.78 0.59 0.00
PGD-1.0 99.30 48.78 36.15 95.06 46.84 2.71 0.00
PGD-2.0 98.76 56.14 45.48 94.82 72.70 14.20 0.21
PGD-3.0 97.14 60.36 51.17 90.01 71.03 38.93 4.71
PGD-4.0 93.41 59.52 51.05 82.34 66.25 43.44 12.18
PGDLS-1.0 99.39 47.61 34.66 94.33 42.44 1.89 0.00
PGDLS-2.0 99.09 54.73 43.64 95.22 69.33 10.01 0.01
PGDLS-3.0 97.52 60.13 50.78 90.86 71.91 36.80 3.56
PGDLS-4.0 93.68 59.49 50.95 82.67 67.21 43.68 10.23
MMA-2.0-sd0 99.26 54.01 42.69 95.94 67.78 7.03 0.03
MMA-2.0-sd1 99.21 54.04 42.74 95.72 68.83 6.42 0.00
MMAC-2.0-sd0 99.27 53.85 42.50 95.59 68.37 6.03 0.01
MMAC-2.0-sd1 99.28 54.34 43.10 95.78 68.18 8.45 0.00
MMA-4.0-sd0 98.61 62.17 53.06 94.06 73.51 39.66 5.02
MMA-4.0-sd1 98.61 62.01 52.86 93.72 73.18 38.98 5.58
MMAC-4.0-sd0 98.71 62.25 53.13 93.93 74.01 39.34 5.24
MMAC-4.0-sd1 98.81 61.88 52.64 93.98 73.70 37.78 5.11
MMA-6.0-sd0 98.16 62.45 53.52 92.90 72.59 39.68 8.93
MMA-6.0-sd1 98.45 62.24 53.19 93.37 72.93 37.63 8.83
MMAC-6.0-sd0 98.32 62.32 53.31 93.16 72.63 38.78 8.69
MMAC-6.0-sd1 98.50 62.49 53.48 93.48 73.50 38.63 8.32
PGD-ens 98.87 56.13 45.44 94.37 70.16 16.79 0.46
PGDLS-ens 99.14 54.71 43.60 94.52 67.45 12.33 0.11
DDN-Rony et al. 99.02 59.93 50.15 95.65 77.65 25.44 1.87
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Table 5: Accuracies of models trained on CIFAR10 with `2-norm constrained attacks. These robust
accuracies are calculated under both combined (whitebox+transfer) PGD attacks.
CIFAR10
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
RobAcc under different , combined (whitebox+transfer) attacks
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
STD 94.92 15.82 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PGD-0.5 89.10 33.63 22.53 65.61 33.21 11.25 2.31 0.28
PGD-1.0 83.25 39.70 30.99 66.69 46.08 26.05 11.92 4.21
PGD-1.5 75.80 41.75 34.94 62.70 48.32 33.72 20.07 9.91
PGD-2.0 71.05 41.78 35.92 59.76 47.85 35.29 23.15 13.56
PGD-2.5 65.17 40.93 36.08 55.60 45.76 35.76 26.00 17.27
PGDLS-0.5 89.43 33.41 22.21 65.49 32.40 10.73 2.09 0.33
PGDLS-1.0 83.62 39.46 30.63 67.29 45.30 25.43 11.08 4.03
PGDLS-1.5 77.03 41.74 34.68 63.76 48.43 33.04 19.00 9.17
PGDLS-2.0 72.14 42.15 36.16 60.90 48.22 35.21 23.19 13.26
PGDLS-2.5 66.21 41.21 36.21 56.45 46.66 35.93 25.51 16.51
MMA-1.0-sd0 89.02 35.18 24.41 65.43 36.89 14.77 4.18 0.79
MMA-1.0-sd1 89.97 35.20 24.25 66.16 36.10 14.04 4.17 0.79
MMAC-1.0-sd0 88.02 35.55 25.06 66.18 37.75 15.58 4.74 1.03
MMAC-1.0-sd1 88.92 35.69 25.05 66.81 37.16 15.71 4.49 1.07
MMA-2.0-sd0 86.06 39.32 29.97 65.28 43.82 24.85 11.53 4.36
MMA-2.0-sd1 85.04 39.68 30.61 64.69 44.36 25.89 12.92 5.19
MMAC-2.0-sd0 84.22 40.48 31.73 65.91 45.66 27.40 14.18 5.50
MMAC-2.0-sd1 85.16 39.81 30.75 65.36 44.44 26.42 12.63 4.88
MMA-3.0-sd0 83.86 40.62 31.97 64.14 45.61 28.12 15.00 6.97
MMA-3.0-sd1 84.00 40.66 32.00 63.81 45.22 28.47 15.41 7.08
MMAC-3.0-sd0 82.11 41.59 33.49 64.22 46.41 30.23 17.85 8.73
MMAC-3.0-sd1 81.79 41.16 33.03 63.58 45.59 29.77 17.52 8.69
PGD-ens 85.63 40.39 31.34 62.98 45.87 27.91 14.23 5.72
PGDLS-ens 86.11 40.38 31.23 63.74 46.21 27.58 13.32 5.31
DDN-Rony et al. 89.05 36.23 25.67 66.51 39.02 16.60 5.02 1.20
Table 6: Accuracies of models trained on MNIST with `∞-norm constrained attacks. These robust
accuracies are calculated under only whitebox PGD attacks.
MNIST
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
RobAcc under different , whitebox only
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
STD 99.21 35.02 18.97 73.59 2.31 0.00 0.00
PGD-0.1 99.40 48.91 36.29 96.35 48.71 0.09 0.00
PGD-0.2 99.22 57.93 47.60 97.44 92.12 0.86 0.00
PGD-0.3 98.96 77.35 71.95 97.90 96.00 91.86 2.03
PGD-0.4 96.64 91.51 90.22 94.79 92.27 88.82 85.02
PGD-0.45 11.35 11.35 11.35 11.35 11.35 11.35 11.35
PGDLS-0.1 99.43 46.94 33.82 95.41 39.85 0.02 0.00
PGDLS-0.2 99.38 58.44 48.20 97.38 89.49 5.95 0.00
PGDLS-0.3 99.10 76.85 71.29 97.98 95.66 90.63 0.90
PGDLS-0.4 98.98 95.49 94.61 98.13 96.42 94.02 89.89
PGDLS-0.45 98.89 95.72 94.92 97.91 96.64 94.54 90.60
MMA-0.45-sd0 98.98 95.06 94.07 97.91 96.22 93.63 88.54
MMA-0.45-sd1 99.02 95.45 94.55 97.96 96.30 94.16 89.80
MMAC-0.45-sd0 98.95 94.97 93.97 97.89 96.26 93.57 88.16
MMAC-0.45-sd1 98.90 94.83 93.81 97.83 96.18 93.34 87.91
PGD-ens 99.28 58.02 47.70 97.31 90.11 3.38 0.00
PGDLS-ens 99.34 59.09 49.02 97.50 90.56 8.03 0.00
PGD-Madry et al. 98.53 76.08 70.47 97.08 94.87 89.79 0.13
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Table 7: Accuracies of models trained on CIFAR10 with `∞-norm constrained attacks. These robust
accuracies are calculated under only whitebox PGD attacks.
CIFAR10
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
RobAcc under different , whitebox only
4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
STD 94.92 10.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PGD-4 90.44 22.97 14.53 66.33 33.51 12.27 3.03 0.77 0.25 0.07 0.02
PGD-8 85.14 27.28 20.05 67.73 46.49 26.69 12.37 4.71 1.58 0.62 0.23
PGD-12 77.86 28.55 22.39 63.90 48.25 32.19 18.78 9.58 4.12 1.59 0.72
PGD-16 68.86 28.42 23.36 58.07 46.17 33.84 22.99 13.65 7.19 3.43 1.57
PGD-20 61.06 27.73 23.57 51.75 43.32 34.22 25.19 16.36 9.65 5.33 2.73
PGD-24 10.90 9.98 9.86 10.60 10.34 10.11 10.01 9.91 9.74 9.39 8.81
PGD-28 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
PGD-32 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00
PGDLS-4 89.87 22.43 14.00 63.98 31.93 11.57 3.43 0.77 0.18 0.09 0.05
PGDLS-8 85.63 27.22 19.92 67.96 46.19 26.24 12.28 4.54 1.52 0.45 0.21
PGDLS-12 79.39 28.50 22.14 64.63 48.10 31.40 17.99 8.80 4.01 1.51 0.67
PGDLS-16 70.68 28.53 23.26 59.44 47.04 33.78 21.94 12.79 6.66 3.07 1.34
PGDLS-20 65.81 27.82 23.07 54.96 44.46 33.41 22.94 14.27 8.07 4.37 2.08
PGDLS-24 58.36 27.25 23.36 49.09 41.47 32.90 24.84 16.93 10.88 7.04 3.76
PGDLS-28 50.07 25.68 22.63 40.77 35.07 30.18 24.76 19.40 14.22 9.96 6.65
PGDLS-32 38.80 22.79 20.79 26.19 25.34 24.72 23.21 20.98 18.13 15.12 12.66
MMA-12-sd0 88.52 29.34 21.94 67.49 46.11 29.22 16.65 8.62 4.36 2.05 1.03
MMA-12-sd1 87.82 30.30 23.11 66.77 46.77 31.19 19.40 10.93 5.72 2.84 1.29
MMAC-12-sd0 88.59 27.54 19.91 67.99 43.62 24.79 12.74 5.85 2.68 1.09 0.51
MMAC-12-sd1 88.91 26.68 18.90 67.17 43.63 23.62 10.80 4.07 1.20 0.50 0.18
MMA-20-sd0 87.06 36.00 29.61 68.00 52.98 40.13 28.92 19.78 13.04 8.47 5.60
MMA-20-sd1 87.44 34.49 27.87 67.40 51.55 37.94 26.48 17.76 11.31 6.74 3.76
MMAC-20-sd0 86.56 31.72 24.87 67.07 48.74 34.06 21.97 13.37 7.56 4.06 2.11
MMAC-20-sd1 85.87 33.07 26.47 65.63 48.11 34.70 24.73 16.45 10.97 7.00 4.14
MMA-32-sd0 86.11 38.87 32.97 67.57 53.70 42.56 32.88 24.91 18.57 13.79 9.76
MMA-32-sd1 86.36 39.13 33.23 68.80 56.02 44.62 33.97 24.71 17.37 11.94 8.39
MMAC-32-sd0 84.36 36.58 30.60 65.25 50.20 38.78 30.01 22.57 16.66 12.30 9.07
MMAC-32-sd1 84.76 33.49 27.08 64.66 48.23 35.65 25.74 17.86 11.86 7.79 4.88
PGD-ens 87.38 28.83 21.51 64.85 47.67 30.37 16.63 7.79 3.01 1.25 0.52
PGDLS-ens 76.73 30.60 24.83 61.16 49.46 36.63 23.90 13.92 7.62 3.91 2.05
PGD-Madry et al. 87.14 27.36 19.89 68.01 44.70 25.15 12.52 5.50 2.25 0.73 0.27
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Table 8: Accuracies of models trained on MNIST with `2-norm constrained attacks. These robust
accuracies are calculated under only whitebox PGD attacks.
MNIST
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
RobAcc under different , whitebox only
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
STD 99.21 41.90 27.57 86.61 23.02 0.64 0.00
PGD-1.0 99.30 49.55 37.11 95.07 48.99 4.36 0.01
PGD-2.0 98.76 56.38 45.79 94.82 72.94 15.08 0.31
PGD-3.0 97.14 60.94 51.89 90.02 71.53 40.72 5.28
PGD-4.0 93.41 59.93 51.56 82.41 66.49 44.36 12.99
PGDLS-1.0 99.39 48.17 35.36 94.35 43.96 2.97 0.16
PGDLS-2.0 99.09 55.17 44.19 95.22 69.73 11.80 0.03
PGDLS-3.0 97.52 60.60 51.37 90.87 72.24 38.39 3.99
PGDLS-4.0 93.68 59.89 51.44 82.73 67.37 44.59 11.07
MMA-2.0-sd0 99.26 54.12 42.83 95.94 68.08 7.27 0.03
MMA-2.0-sd1 99.21 54.12 42.85 95.72 68.96 6.72 0.00
MMAC-2.0-sd0 99.27 53.97 42.64 95.59 68.66 6.32 0.01
MMAC-2.0-sd1 99.28 54.46 43.26 95.79 68.45 8.79 0.01
MMA-4.0-sd0 98.61 62.44 53.40 94.06 73.60 40.29 5.66
MMA-4.0-sd1 98.61 62.22 53.13 93.72 73.23 39.53 6.03
MMAC-4.0-sd0 98.71 62.51 53.45 93.93 74.06 40.02 5.81
MMAC-4.0-sd1 98.81 62.22 53.07 93.98 73.81 38.76 5.75
MMA-6.0-sd0 98.16 62.67 53.79 92.90 72.71 40.28 9.29
MMA-6.0-sd1 98.45 62.52 53.54 93.37 73.02 38.49 9.28
MMAC-6.0-sd0 98.32 62.60 53.67 93.16 72.72 39.47 9.35
MMAC-6.0-sd1 98.50 62.73 53.79 93.48 73.57 39.25 8.86
PGD-ens 98.87 56.57 45.99 94.73 70.98 17.76 0.51
PGDLS-ens 99.14 54.98 43.93 94.86 68.08 12.68 0.12
DDN-Rony et al. 99.02 60.34 50.67 95.65 77.79 26.59 2.64
30
Table 9: Accuracies of models trained on CIFAR10 with `2-norm constrained attacks. These robust
accuracies are calculated under only whitebox PGD attacks.
CIFAR10
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
RobAcc under different , whitebox only
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
STD 94.92 15.82 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PGD-0.5 89.10 33.64 22.55 65.61 33.23 11.29 2.34 0.29
PGD-1.0 83.25 39.74 31.04 66.69 46.11 26.16 12.00 4.26
PGD-1.5 75.80 41.81 35.02 62.74 48.35 33.80 20.17 10.03
PGD-2.0 71.05 41.88 36.05 59.80 47.92 35.39 23.34 13.81
PGD-2.5 65.17 41.03 36.20 55.66 45.82 35.90 26.14 17.49
PGDLS-0.5 89.43 33.44 22.25 65.50 32.42 10.78 2.17 0.36
PGDLS-1.0 83.62 39.50 30.68 67.30 45.35 25.49 11.19 4.08
PGDLS-1.5 77.03 41.80 34.75 63.76 48.46 33.11 19.12 9.32
PGDLS-2.0 72.14 42.24 36.27 60.96 48.28 35.32 23.38 13.39
PGDLS-2.5 66.21 41.34 36.36 56.49 46.72 36.13 25.73 16.75
MMA-1.0-sd0 89.02 35.49 24.79 65.46 37.38 15.34 4.76 1.00
MMA-1.0-sd1 89.97 35.41 24.49 66.24 36.47 14.44 4.43 0.89
MMAC-1.0-sd0 88.02 35.58 25.09 66.19 37.80 15.61 4.79 1.06
MMAC-1.0-sd1 88.92 35.74 25.10 66.81 37.22 15.78 4.57 1.14
MMA-2.0-sd0 86.06 42.80 34.14 65.55 46.29 30.60 18.23 10.05
MMA-2.0-sd1 85.04 42.96 34.55 65.23 46.32 31.07 19.36 10.75
MMAC-2.0-sd0 84.22 41.22 32.62 65.98 46.11 28.56 15.60 6.86
MMAC-2.0-sd1 85.16 40.60 31.69 65.45 45.27 28.07 13.99 5.67
MMA-3.0-sd0 83.86 46.46 38.99 64.67 49.34 36.40 26.50 18.02
MMA-3.0-sd1 84.00 45.59 37.91 64.31 48.50 35.92 24.81 16.03
MMAC-3.0-sd0 82.11 43.67 35.98 64.25 47.61 33.48 22.07 12.50
MMAC-3.0-sd1 81.79 43.75 36.14 63.82 47.33 33.79 22.36 13.40
PGD-ens 85.63 41.32 32.46 63.27 46.66 29.35 15.95 7.09
PGDLS-ens 86.11 41.39 32.45 64.04 46.99 29.11 15.51 6.59
DDN-Rony et al. 89.05 36.25 25.69 66.51 39.02 16.63 5.05 1.24
Table 10: The TransferGap of models trained on MNIST with `∞-norm constrained attacks. Trans-
ferGap indicates the gap between robust accuracy under only whitebox PGD attacks and under
combined (whitebox+transfer) PGD attacks.
MNIST
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
TransferGap: RobAcc drop after adding transfer attacks
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
STD - 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
PGD-0.1 - 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.20 0.08 0.00
PGD-0.2 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
PGD-0.3 - 0.38 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.10 1.81
PGD-0.4 - 2.14 2.67 0.10 0.70 2.33 7.55
PGD-0.45 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PGDLS-0.1 - 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.43 0.02 0.00
PGDLS-0.2 - 0.08 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.42 0.00
PGDLS-0.3 - 0.29 0.36 0.01 0.00 0.54 0.90
PGDLS-0.4 - 2.42 3.02 0.01 0.13 1.01 10.93
PGDLS-0.45 - 0.97 1.22 0.00 0.30 1.25 3.32
MMA-0.45-sd0 - 1.12 1.40 0.01 0.17 1.28 4.13
MMA-0.45-sd1 - 1.42 1.78 0.03 0.28 1.72 5.07
MMAC-0.45-sd0 - 0.83 1.04 0.02 0.25 0.98 2.92
MMAC-0.45-sd1 - 0.80 0.99 0.01 0.18 0.71 3.08
PGD-ens - 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.01 0.00
PGDLS-ens - 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.16 0.07 0.00
PGD-Madry et al. - 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.15 0.02
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Table 11: The TransferGap of models trained on CIFAR10 with `∞-norm constrained attacks.
TransferGap indicates the gap between robust accuracy under only whitebox PGD attacks and
under combined (whitebox+transfer) PGD attacks.
CIFAR10
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
TransferGap: RobAcc drop after adding transfer attacks
4 8 12 16 20 24 28 32
STD - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PGD-4 - 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01
PGD-8 - 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01
PGD-12 - 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.02
PGD-16 - 0.14 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.26 0.28 0.18 0.11 0.03
PGD-20 - 0.39 0.44 0.03 0.19 0.49 0.64 0.70 0.60 0.59 0.31
PGD-24 - 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.13
PGD-28 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PGD-32 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PGDLS-4 - 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.02 0.01 0.00
PGDLS-8 - 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.00
PGDLS-12 - 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.06 0.03 0.02
PGDLS-16 - 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.22 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.03
PGDLS-20 - 0.21 0.24 0.00 0.07 0.28 0.41 0.47 0.28 0.29 0.13
PGDLS-24 - 0.73 0.82 0.04 0.34 0.80 1.08 1.23 1.22 1.18 0.65
PGDLS-28 - 1.47 1.66 0.06 0.46 1.18 1.99 2.57 2.73 2.34 1.92
PGDLS-32 - 2.91 3.28 0.03 0.38 1.50 3.25 4.76 5.21 5.30 5.78
MMA-12-sd0 - 3.02 3.40 0.53 3.53 6.00 6.36 5.19 3.12 1.59 0.90
MMA-12-sd1 - 4.06 4.57 0.54 3.67 7.62 9.08 7.37 4.68 2.46 1.15
MMAC-12-sd0 - 0.67 0.76 0.03 0.20 0.72 1.29 1.58 1.25 0.64 0.35
MMAC-12-sd1 - 0.45 0.50 0.09 0.66 1.05 1.04 0.70 0.28 0.15 0.06
MMA-20-sd0 - 8.59 9.66 1.46 7.59 13.84 15.83 14.46 11.08 7.68 5.37
MMA-20-sd1 - 6.72 7.56 1.12 5.95 10.61 12.48 11.72 9.08 6.00 3.51
MMAC-20-sd0 - 2.86 3.22 0.15 1.85 4.23 5.42 5.23 4.31 2.89 1.68
MMAC-20-sd1 - 4.35 4.90 0.19 2.00 4.74 7.43 8.18 7.37 5.67 3.58
MMA-32-sd0 - 10.51 11.83 1.55 7.39 13.68 16.90 17.47 15.63 12.67 9.31
MMA-32-sd1 - 10.38 11.67 1.94 8.90 14.99 17.88 17.15 13.99 10.63 7.92
MMAC-32-sd0 - 7.19 8.09 0.43 3.02 7.29 11.10 12.41 11.89 10.33 8.26
MMAC-32-sd1 - 4.42 4.97 0.25 2.28 5.29 7.50 8.01 6.87 5.59 3.96
PGD-ens - 0.73 0.82 0.26 0.72 1.49 1.53 1.44 0.66 0.34 0.13
PGDLS-ens - 1.08 1.21 0.64 1.25 1.57 1.76 1.64 1.45 0.77 0.62
PGD-Madry et al. - 0.14 0.16 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.37 0.32 0.30 0.09 0.04
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Table 12: The TransferGap of models trained on MNIST with `2-norm constrained attacks. Trans-
ferGap indicates the gap between robust accuracy under only whitebox PGD attacks and under
combined (whitebox+transfer) PGD attacks.
MNIST
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
TransferGap: RobAcc drop after adding transfer attacks
1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
STD - 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.24 0.05 0.00
PGD-1.0 - 0.76 0.96 0.01 2.15 1.65 0.01
PGD-2.0 - 0.24 0.30 0.00 0.24 0.88 0.10
PGD-3.0 - 0.57 0.72 0.01 0.50 1.79 0.57
PGD-4.0 - 0.41 0.51 0.07 0.24 0.92 0.81
PGDLS-1.0 - 0.56 0.70 0.02 1.52 1.08 0.16
PGDLS-2.0 - 0.44 0.55 0.00 0.40 1.79 0.02
PGDLS-3.0 - 0.47 0.59 0.01 0.33 1.59 0.43
PGDLS-4.0 - 0.39 0.49 0.06 0.16 0.91 0.84
MMA-2.0-sd0 - 0.11 0.13 0.00 0.30 0.24 0.00
MMA-2.0-sd1 - 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.30 0.00
MMAC-2.0-sd0 - 0.12 0.15 0.00 0.29 0.29 0.00
MMAC-2.0-sd1 - 0.13 0.16 0.01 0.27 0.34 0.01
MMA-4.0-sd0 - 0.27 0.34 0.00 0.09 0.63 0.64
MMA-4.0-sd1 - 0.21 0.26 0.00 0.05 0.55 0.45
MMAC-4.0-sd0 - 0.26 0.33 0.00 0.05 0.68 0.57
MMAC-4.0-sd1 - 0.35 0.43 0.00 0.11 0.98 0.64
MMA-6.0-sd0 - 0.22 0.27 0.00 0.12 0.60 0.36
MMA-6.0-sd1 - 0.28 0.35 0.00 0.09 0.86 0.45
MMAC-6.0-sd0 - 0.29 0.36 0.00 0.09 0.69 0.66
MMAC-6.0-sd1 - 0.25 0.31 0.00 0.07 0.62 0.54
PGD-ens - 0.44 0.55 0.36 0.82 0.97 0.05
PGDLS-ens - 0.27 0.33 0.34 0.63 0.35 0.01
DDN-Rony et al. - 0.41 0.51 0.00 0.14 1.15 0.77
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Table 13: The TransferGap of models trained on CIFAR10 with `2-norm constrained attacks. Trans-
ferGap indicates the gap between robust accuracy under only whitebox PGD attacks and under
combined (whitebox+transfer) PGD attacks.
CIFAR10
Model Cln Acc AvgAcc AvgRobAcc
TransferGap: RobAcc drop after adding transfer attacks
0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
STD - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PGD-0.5 - 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01
PGD-1.0 - 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.08 0.05
PGD-1.5 - 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.12
PGD-2.0 - 0.11 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.19 0.25
PGD-2.5 - 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.14 0.22
PGDLS-0.5 - 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.03
PGDLS-1.0 - 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.05
PGDLS-1.5 - 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.15
PGDLS-2.0 - 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.19 0.13
PGDLS-2.5 - 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.20 0.22 0.24
MMA-1.0-sd0 - 0.31 0.38 0.03 0.49 0.57 0.58 0.21
MMA-1.0-sd1 - 0.20 0.24 0.08 0.37 0.40 0.26 0.10
MMAC-1.0-sd0 - 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.03
MMAC-1.0-sd1 - 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07
MMA-2.0-sd0 - 3.48 4.18 0.27 2.47 5.75 6.70 5.69
MMA-2.0-sd1 - 3.28 3.94 0.54 1.96 5.18 6.44 5.56
MMAC-2.0-sd0 - 0.74 0.89 0.07 0.45 1.16 1.42 1.36
MMAC-2.0-sd1 - 0.79 0.94 0.09 0.83 1.65 1.36 0.79
MMA-3.0-sd0 - 5.85 7.02 0.53 3.73 8.28 11.50 11.05
MMA-3.0-sd1 - 4.93 5.92 0.50 3.28 7.45 9.40 8.95
MMAC-3.0-sd0 - 2.08 2.49 0.03 1.20 3.25 4.22 3.77
MMAC-3.0-sd1 - 2.59 3.11 0.24 1.74 4.02 4.84 4.71
PGD-ens - 0.94 1.12 0.29 0.79 1.44 1.72 1.37
PGDLS-ens - 1.01 1.22 0.30 0.78 1.53 2.19 1.28
DDN-Rony et al. - 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04
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